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Abstract. We study the impact of positional preferences - with respect to wealth in addition 
to consumption - on endogenous growth, welfare, and corrective taxation. We consider first 
an AK model, and then introduce public capital. Labor supply is exogenous. We find 
analytically that the presence of wealth positionality always causes distortions (although a 
preference for absolute wealth by itself is non-distortionary). Consumption positionality 
introduces a distortion only if wealth is an argument in the utility function and the marginal 
degree of positionality in wealth does not match that of consumption. Two corrective tax 
instruments: a consumption- or an income tax, are required for internalization of externalities 
in an AK set-up; the optimal choice of public investment is an additional instrument when 
public capital is introduced. Numerical simulations – pointing towards high corrective tax 
rates and their strong impact on growth and welfare – complement the theoretical analysis. 
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The poor man's son ... when he begins to look around him, admires the 
condition of the rich. ... He does not even imagine that they are really happier 
than other people: but he imagines that they possess more means of 
happiness. ... And it is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is 
this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of 
mankind. It is this which first prompted them to ... build houses, to found 
cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and 
arts, which ennoble and embellish human life; which have entirely changed 




As the above passage from his Theory of Moral Sentiments highlights, social comparisons and 
conspicuous consumption were considered significant attributes by Adam Smith, writing in 
the mid-eighteenth century. Likewise, in his Theory of the Leisure Class, Thorstein Veblen 
(1899) emphasized the quest for status – via conspicuous consumption and wealth – as an 
important component of the pursuit of self-interest.
1
 Aside from classical economists and 
political philosophers such as Smith and Veblen, among others, positional (or reference-
dependent) preferences, 2  where the reference point is social distinction and/or status in 
relation to others in society, were studied from ancient times by philosophers like Plato, and 
so have a very long history.  
 
Given the importance of positional preferences, as echoed by Smith and others of repute, this 
paper studies the impact of such externalities on endogenous growth, welfare, and corrective 
taxation – when people are positional with respect to wealth in addition to consumption. In 
contrast to the previous literature, we show that the presence of positionality in wealth always 
introduces a distortion (irrespective of whether consumption positionality exists), which is 
corrected by an optimal consumption- (income-) tax that is negative (positive). Also, 
positionality with respect to consumption is almost always distortionary, and this is despite 
the fact that labor supply is exogenous, so long as individuals either have a preference for 
wealth or are positional with respect to wealth. This is because the Keynes-Ramsey rule 
differs between the decentralized economy and the social optimum in that case, as the 
marginal utility of wealth then depends on the consumption externality. 
 
                                               
1
 Veblen, thus, argues: “Conspicuous consumption of valuable goods is a means of reputability to the gentleman 
of leisure.” (Veblen, 1899, p. 64). 
2
 Different terms for positional preferences have been used in the literature, with slightly differing meanings. 
They include status preferences, status consumption, conspicuous consumption, conspicuous wealth, relative 
consumption, relative wealth, keeping up/catching up with the Joneses, jealousy/envy, external habits, or simply 
consumption externality. 
 2
Positional preferences expressed through social comparisons, from an individual standpoint, 
are highly topical today as well. One can consider a thought experiment where one is asked to 
choose between world A in which they will live in a 4,000-square-foot house and others will 
live in 6,000-square-foot houses; and world B, in which they will live in a 3,000-square-foot 
house, others in 2,000-square-foot houses. If only absolute consumption mattered, A would be 
clearly better. Yet most people say they would pick B, where their absolute house size is 
smaller but their relative house size is larger.3 This issue about positionality could be quite 
important from a national perspective as well. A nation builds up its stocks of weapons to 
match those of rival nations in a scenario where estimates of a rival’s arms stocks are 
imperfect, and thereby spending on arms in equilibrium typically turns out to be more than is 
warranted. As pointed out by Frank (2008), cross-national comparisons for armaments are 
more pronounced than for other consumption goods, as consequences of being less armed 
than others (and thereby compromising on national security) are more severe than for other 
consumption goods. 
 
In the more recent past, positional preferences have been studied extensively, and their high 
empirical significance has been well established (cf. Solnick and Hemenway (1998), (2005), 
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Alpizar et al. (2005), etc.). These papers find hard evidence 
for strong positional concerns over income: people are willing to forsake higher absolute 
income but lower income relative to others in favor of lower absolute income but higher 
relative income. For example, Alpizar et al. (2005) and Solnick and Hemenway (2005) find 
that people are positional regarding durable goods like houses and cars (certainly more than 
for leisure time like vacations).
4
 These results also strike a chord with the happiness literature, 
following Easterlin (1995), where positional preferences help to explain the Easterlin 
paradox, which shows that while US real income per capita almost doubled over the period, 
1973-2004, happiness levels have remained static. This is largely because for most people, 
income is a positional good, and as such they prefer to have more income than others in their 
reference group (which is less true about leisure). 
  
                                               
3 See Frank (2005, 2008), who uses the term positional good to denote goods for which the link between context 
and evaluation is strongest. 
4
 For a recent review of the literature, see Truyts (2010), Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013), or Wendner (2014). 
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In this context, the issue of whether and how public policy should be geared towards 
addressing the “inefficiency” associated with positional preferences becomes moot.
5
 Within 
the literature on optimal income taxation, it has been shown that with social comparisons 
being present, substantially higher optimal marginal income tax rates may result; see Oswald 
(1983), Blomquist (1993), Ireland (2001), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010, 
2013), Wendner and Goulder (2008). Frank (2005) and Layard (2006), among others, 
advocate taxation on income or consumption in order to correct the inefficient misallocation 
of time whereby people spend too much time working to achieve what is at best a temporary 
gain in relative income. In Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005), a consumption externality makes the 
decentralized equilibrium allocation inefficient, which can be corrected by either a 
consumption tax or an income tax. If consumers’ willingness to shift current consumption to 
the future is sub-optimally low (high), then optimal fiscal policy consists of either a 
decreasing (an increasing) sequence of consumption taxes or a subsidy (tax) on 
income/output. In Nakamoto (2009), the reason for the decentralized outcome to differ from 
the first-best is due to a preference for wealth: when households feel jealousy (admiration) 
about others’ consumption, the long-run levels of consumption and the capital stock are lower 
(higher) than the social optimum, calling for a positive (negative) consumption tax and a 
negative (positive) income tax.  
 
A salient feature of our baseline model is that households derive satisfaction from 
accumulating wealth, and also exhibit positional preferences with respect to wealth. As this is 
a key contribution of this paper, we introduce positionality with respect to consumption as an 
extension of the main model. Also, as we seek to identify distortions stemming from 
externalities in the absence of a work-leisure choice, we consider labor supply as being 
exogenous.
6
 On the production side, we consider first a simple endogenous growth framework 
with an AK framework, following Rebelo (1991), and later complement this with public 
capital as the growth engine, a la Futagami et al. (1993). We devise corrective income- and 
consumption tax instruments that enable the decentralized economy to achieve the first-best 
                                               
5
 A nice example of such inefficiency is provided by Frank (2008): if some job candidates begin wearing 
expensive suits for interviews, then from any individual job seeker's point of view, the best response might well 
be to wear the same; however, this outcome may be inefficient, since when all spend more on such suits, each 
candidate's probability of success remains unchanged. Here some form of collective restraint on expenditure 
would be useful, but private negotiations are likely to be impractical and hence public policy could provide a 
solution. 
6
 In sharp contrast to the prior literature (see, for example, Rauscher (1997a), Fisher and Hof (2000), Liu and 
Turnovsky (2005)), where positional preferences with respect to consumption do not cause any distortions along 
a balanced growth path so long as labor supply is exogenous, here the fact that individuals derive utility from 
wealth is sufficient to cause distortions under consumption positionality. 
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outcome, and proceed to compare decentralized and optimal growth rates and welfare levels 
in our model.  
 
In this paper, wealth in the form of capital is an argument in households’ utility functions, as 
in Zou (1994, 1995), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), Futagami and Shibata (1998) and Nakamoto 
(2009), etc. One motivation for the inclusion of capital in utility is due to Zou (1994) – 
following Weber (1904) – who argues that the incentive for accumulating capital lies not only 
in maximizing long-run consumption, but also to increase wealth, which in itself adds to 
agents’ utility. Wealth-dependent preferences have been considered in the earlier literature as 
well, primarily focused on the Pigou- (or real balance-) effect.
7
 Later, wealth in the form of 
real money balances, which provide utility by facilitating transactions and reducing shopping 
time (see, e.g., Croushore 1993), was introduced directly into the utility function in Ramsey-
type of optimizing models.  
 
In addition, households are also positional with respect to wealth in our model. In the context 
of positional preferences, (relative) wealth has been frequently considered an argument in the 
utility function before (cf., among others, Corneo and Jeanne 1997, 2001, Fisher and Hof 
2000, 2005, Futagami and Shibata 1998, Hof and Wirl 2008, Pham 2005, Rauscher 1997a, 
Tournemaine and Tsoukis 2008). The origins of positionality as regards wealth can be traced 
back to the concept of ‘Protestant ethic’, coined by Max Weber (1904), who argued that the 
rise of capitalism came hand in hand with notions of puritanism/asceticism, thriftiness and 
piety, which was manifested in the accumulation of wealth and assets, rather than via 
conspicuous consumption (see also Rae, 1905, pp. 59-60). As Rauscher (1997b) contends, 
given that such norms are social phenomena, it is not “an absolute measure of asceticism” but 
“a socially determined standard” that is relevant, and the more puritan/ascetic the average 
person in society is, the more puritan must the individual person be to satisfy that norm. This 
notion of status, and the means to attain that, could explain why some countries (for example, 
in Northern Europe) have typically witnessed higher rates of saving and capital accumulation 
than some others (in Southern Europe) over the years. 
 
                                               
7
 The idea behind the Pigou effect is that if the economy is stuck in a “liquidity trap” situation with 
unemployment and falling prices (but an unchanged nominal money stock), then at some point people would 
start feeling sufficiently wealthier due to the higher real balances at their disposal; this would stimulate aggregate 
demand via consumption, and thereby overcome the unemployment problem. 
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With these features, we can now highlight some of the important contributions of our paper. 
First, with absolute wealth in the utility function, but without positionality in wealth (or 
consumption), there is no distortion, and hence there is no divergence between the 
decentralized outcome and the social optimum (first-best). But once people are positional in 
wealth, individual wealth accumulation introduces an externality, and the presence of absolute 
wealth does impact on the strength of the distortion via the marginal utility of wealth.  
 
Second, if positionality in wealth is introduced (with or without absolute wealth in utility), it 
follows from above that there is always a distortion, which requires consumption- or income 
taxes/subsidies to correct the distortion. In some respects, our paper is close to Nakamoto 
(2009), where labor supply is inelastic, as in our case. In both set-ups, the distortionary effect 
of consumption externalities persists in the long-run because of wealth-dependent 
preferences. The key differences, however, are that our paper is an endogenous growth model 
while he considers a neoclassical growth model, and also that wealth externalities are not 
considered by him. It is important to observe that in contrast to our paper and Nakamoto’s, in 
the prior literature that does not consider wealth positionality but considers consumption 
externalities instead, the latter are distortionary only when leisure is an argument of the utility 
function.
8 
 In the absence of work-leisure choice, a consumption externality does not have any 
impact on the steady state equilibrium of a decentralized economy.
 
 (See, for example, 
Rauscher (1997a), Fisher and Hof (2000), and Liu and Turnovsky (2005), in the context of a 
neoclassical growth model). By contrast, in our case it is not elastic labor supply that makes 
the consumption externality distortionary, but rather the wealth externality that does so, 
because it impacts on the marginal utility of consumption. 
 
Third, if absolute and relative wealth are both included in the utility function (the baseline 
case), then a consumption subsidy or an income tax has to be employed to correct the 
distortion and prevent too much wealth accumulation relative to the social optimum. If, in 
addition, individuals are positional also with respect to consumption, and providing the desire 
to raise consumption is different from the desire to increase saving (wealth), the optimal 
consumption and income tax rates differ from zero even if government spending is chosen 
optimally. For empirically supported degrees of positionality, these corrective tax rates are 
typically quite large, and they impose substantive effects on the growth rate and welfare. 
                                               
8
 For instance, in Dupor and Liu (2003), Liu and Turnovsky (2005), and Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007), where 
labor supply is endogenously determined, the decentralized economy diverges from the social optimum in the 
long-run. 
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Hence, our theoretical and numerical results give rise to several policy prescriptions, which 
critically depend on whether households are more positional with respect to consumption or 
to wealth.  
 
Fourth, for the special case of the marginal degree of positionality of wealth exactly matching 
that of consumption, there is no distortion, as the two externalities exactly counteract each 
other, and hence the optimal consumption- and income taxes/subsidies are both zero. This is 
in contrast to Nakamoto (2009), where wealth externality is not present. 
 
Fifth, for the earlier case, stronger positional preferences via conspicuous wealth and 
conspicuous consumption both have a direct and positive impact on the endogenous growth 
rate, providing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than 1, because then 
positional preferences raise the (long run) elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In an 
endogenous growth framework with a simple AK technology like us, Carroll et al. (1997) 
show that the more individuals care about how consumption compares to the reference level, 
the higher will be the growth rate of consumption in the steady state. In Futagami and Shibata 
(1998), if all consumers are identical, the long-run balanced growth rate is positively related 
to the degree of status preference (but this may not hold with heterogeneous agents). Other 
papers which consider the impact of reference-dependent consumption on growth include Liu 
and Turnovsky (2005), where endogenous growth – but not via public capital – is considered, 
a positive production externality leads to the decentralized growth rate falling short of the 
socially optimal rate (with inelastic labor). Here, consumption externalities affect the 
magnitude of the distortion caused by the production externality.  
 
Finally, we employ our framework to analyze three fiscal policy experiments involving an 
increase in spending on public capital financed by lump-sum, income- or consumption taxes. 
Our numerical results indicate that public spending positively affects both growth and welfare 
in the steady state, and does so quite strongly. This effect via the production side clearly 
dominates the consumption externalities in this regard. The latter is reflected also in the 
‘decisive’ way in which some of the key variables adjust along the transition path in response 




                                               
9
 These results are available in the online appendix rather than in the body of the paper due to space 
considerations. 
 7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the baseline model and its 
extensions, characterizes the macroeconomic equilibrium and the steady state, and also 
derives the social optimum. A number of analytical results are also derived in this context, 
specifying the consumption and income taxes/subsidies that would enable the decentralized 
economy to attain the first-best scenario. Then Section 3 extends the model to include a 
specific source for endogenous growth: public capital. The section also identifies numerically 
the fiscal policies that enable the decentralized economy to replicate the social optimum for 
the generalized model, and links that with growth and welfare. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
An online appendix studies the growth and welfare effects of several fiscal policy 
experiments along the balanced growth path. In addition, the online appendix also contains 
the proofs of propositions given in this paper. 
 
 
2. The Main Model 
 
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model of a closed economy that allows for fully 
endogenous growth. In that context, first, we consider the simplest case of an AK model. 
Next, we complement this case by introducing a public good in the production function. Time 
is considered to be continuous. There is a large number of households and firms, the 
respective number of which we normalize to unity. Households are homogeneous and exhibit 
positional preferences. They derive utility from own consumption, own wealth and wealth 
relative to some wealth reference level (relative wealth) as our baseline model.
10
 As an 
extension to this baseline case, we consider the inclusion of positional preferences with 
respect to consumption. 
 
2.1 The Baseline Model 
 
Households.   Individuals derive utility from own consumption, own wealth and relative 
wealth. Relative wealth is given by individual wealth, K , relative to some wealth reference 
level K :  K / K . As households are homogeneous in our framework, we consider the 
economy’s average wealth level as a natural choice for a household’s wealth reference level.
11
 
                                               
10
 As a special case, we investigate what happens when households do not exhibit a preference for relative 
wealth. 
11
 In a model with heterogeneous households, a household's reference level may be specified more generally (cf. 
Eckerstorfer and Wendner 2013).  
 8
In what follows, we use the terms relative wealth and conspicuous wealth interchangeably. 
An individual household considers the wealth reference level as exogenous.  
 


















































, − ∞ < γ < 1, 0 ≤ η
k
< 1, ξ ≥ 0,
  (0) 
that is, households exhibit constant relative risk aversion, with absolute elasticity of marginal 
utility of consumption equal to  (1− γ ) . Parameter ξ  indexes the preference for wealth. 
Suppose for the moment that ηk = 0 . If  ξ = 0 , the household does not exhibit preferences 
with respect to wealth. With ξ > 0 , households value wealth in addition to consumption. 
Parameter ηk  indexes the degree of concern for relative wealth. Specifically, if ξ = 1, ηk  
represents the marginal degree of positionality (cf. Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002) with 
respect to wealth (see below).13  
 























   (0) 
where β  is the household’s constant rate of time preference. Facing market prices that are 






 so as to 
   (0) 
                                               
12
 The utility function we consider is multiplicative (rather than additive) in consumption and capital as it is more 
general than an additive specification, which is because the marginal rate of substitution between the arguments 
is not constant. Both formulations are widely used in the literature. 
13
 A marginal degree of positionality reflects the share of marginal utility of individual consumption or wealth 
that is due to the fact that own consumption or wealth raises the ratio  C / C  or  K / K , ceteris paribus. 
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The first constraint in (0) is the household’s flow budget constraint, where Y
K
≡ ∂Y / ∂K  








 are respectively the income- and 
consumption tax rate, and  T  denotes lump sum taxes. In our framework, the labor-leisure 
decision is exogenous. As shown below, in the absence of a preference for (relative) wealth, 
the optimal consumption- and income tax rates are zero.  
 
The second constraint in (0) is the No-Ponzi-Game condition, where the rate of interest r is 
determined in competitive factor markets, as discussed below. In equilibrium, the 
transversality condition requires the No-Ponzi-Game condition to hold with strict equality. 
 
Firms.   A homogeneous output, Y, is produced by capital according to the linear technology 
(Rebelo 1991): 
 Y = AK , A > 0  , (0) 
where A is total factor productivity. The depreciation rate of capital is δ
k
∈ 0,1[ ]. We assume 
(A − δ k ) ≥ 0  to ensure a non-negative net productivity. Given competitive factor markets, the 





> β   (A.1) 
ensures positivity of growth rates along the balanced growth path (BGP). In words, 
Assumption (A.1) implies that the rate of interest strictly exceeds the rate of time preference. 
 
Government.   The government’s instruments, in our baseline model, include a consumption 
tax, τ c , an income tax, τ y , and a lump-sum tax, T . These taxes are levied in order to address 
externalities stemming from preferences for wealth as well as from relative wealth. The 
reason for including a consumption tax, despite labor supply being exogenous, is because of 
the consumption-savings distortions generated by the pattern of household preferences, as 
discussed above. Therefore, the consumption tax does not act as a lump-sum tax and may be 
used to correct for potential distortions. The income tax essentially acts as a wealth tax as all 
income in the AK model is capital income.  
 
 10
In each period, the government runs a balanced budget.
14
 The government budget constraint 







Y + T = 0. (0) 
As we consider a closed economy, in the baseline model, the aggregate resource constraint is 
given by: 
  (0) 
In Subsection 3.1 below, we consider a generalized version of this baseline model. In that 
framework, the government also undertakes productive expenditures, G, which are financed 
by the same set of taxes as above, affecting the aggregate resource constraint. 
 
2.1.1 Macroeconomic Equilibrium 
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Next, we define the normalized variables  c ≡ C / K ,  y ≡ Y / K . Using (0) in (0) yields    
  . (0) 
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 We do not include government bonds in our analysis, because this only introduces a no-arbitrage condition, 
which determines the same rate of interest as given above (A.1). 
 11
Differentiating (0) and taking resource constraint (0) into account gives 
  . (0) 
Next, using (0) in (0) and considering  yields: 
 
    
.  (0) 
 
Differential equation (0) represents the model’s one-dimensional dynamic system in the 
dynamic variable  c . As in the basic model without a preference for (relative) wealth, there is 
no transitional dynamics, and the economy jumps from one steady state to another.
15
 Below, 
in our extended model with public capital in the production function, there is transitional 
dynamics because of the presence of an additional stock variable. 
 
The economy will in steady state follow a balanced growth path, defined as a path along 
which  Y ,C  and  K  grow at constant rates. It can easily be verified that these variables grow 




β − γ A − δ k( ) 1+ 1− ηk( )ξ( ) + Aτ y
1− γ 1+ 1− η
k( )ξ( ) + ξ(1− ηk ) + ηk( ) 1+ τ c( )
 , (0) 
where an asterisk (*) indicates steady state values for the decentralized economy. An 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution less than unity ( γ < 0 ) is sufficient for a positive 
consumption-to-capital ratio. Noting (0), the endogenous growth rate of per capita 
consumption (income) is given by Γ* = A −δ
k
− c* . 
 
Based on this baseline model, we will analyze two cases of special interest. First, we study the 
case in which households do not have concern for relative wealth, i.e., ξ > 0, ηk = 0. Second, 
we consider positionality in wealth, i.e., ξ = 1, ηk > 0. Before that, however, we need to spell 
out the socially optimal allocation. From this allocation, by comparing with the market 
economy’s allocation, we derive optimal consumption- and income tax rates for the BGP 
below.   
                                               
15
 It is worthwhile to note that in the paper with positional preferences by Carroll et al. (1997) does have 
transitional dynamics within an AK framework. This is due to the positionality being of the nature of an 
accumulated stock of habits, unlike in our case.  
 12
 
2.1.2 Baseline Model: The Social Optimum 
 
We adopt the primal approach to derive the socially optimal allocation. In contrast to private 
households, the government takes into account that K = K  in its optimizing exercise. The 















+ λ̂ AK − C − δ
k
K   . (0) 
 
Taking the necessary first-order conditions with respect to C  and K  and following the same 
steps as in the decentralized economy, we obtain the growth rate of the consumption-to-
capital ratio: 
 
   (0) 
 
Again, the economy will, in a steady state, follow a BGP. Along the BGP , implying 
that the optimal c is given by: 
 ĉ =
β − γ A −δ k( ) 1+ 1−ηk( )ξ( )
1− γ( ) 1+ 1−ηk( )ξ( )
 , (0) 
where a hat (^) indicates socially optimal values. Variables  C ,  K , and  Y  grow at the same 
constant endogenous growth rate, Γ̂ = A − δ k − ĉ .  
 
2.1.3 Distortions and Optimal Taxation 
 
Given that income and consumption taxes impact on the economy in very different ways, 
what tax and expenditure rates in the decentralized economy will replicate the social planner’s 
optimum? Let these choices be represented by the vector (τ̂ c ,τ̂ y ) . Then, by definition, this 
vector is a description of optimal fiscal policy in the decentralized economy. To determine 
these optimal choices, we will compare the equilibrium outcome (0) with the decentralized 
outcome as given by (0), or, equivalently, by comparing (0) with (0). As a result, we obtain 











k( ) +ηk  ĉ
A
 . (0) 
 
As shown by (0), only one tax rate is required to be chosen (independently) by the 
government to attain the first-best equilibrium. This is because we face a single externality 
here – an individual’s saving decision impacts on both own and average wealth, and thereby 
on relative wealth of all other individuals. An income tax is able to internalize this externality. 
However, given that labor supply is exogenous, this could alternatively be performed by a 
consumption tax. This interesting result extends to a situation in which households are not 
only positional with respect to wealth but also, simultaneously, with respect to consumption. 
In that case, the nature of this externality (in individuals’ consumption-saving decision) 
remains the same, although its size differs, and so the value of the corrective 
consumption/income tax would be different. 
 
A useful benchmark, then, is to derive the tax on consumption, τ̂ c , when τ y = 0  as well as on 
income, τ̂ y , when τ c = 0 .  
 
 τ̂ c =
−
ηk
ηk + (1−ηk )ξ
if ξ > 0 or ηk > 0






, τ̂ y =
ηk ĉ
A
  (0) 




Proposition 1. (Optimal Taxation when wealth is in the utility function) 
If wealth is an argument in the utility function, and 	 > 0 , then the optimal tax rates 
required to attain the first-best differ from zero and take the values given by (0). In this case, 
the optimal consumption tax is negative (i.e., a consumption subsidy), while the optimal 
income tax is positive. A higher value for ξ  lowers the consumption subsidy. 
 
The presence of concern for relative wealth introduces a distortion and gives rise to optimal 
tax rates being different from zero. The distortion induces households to over-save. Therefore, 
the optimal consumption tax is negative, and the optimal income tax is positive. In fact, the 
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 Notice that the second line in (0) cannot be derived from the expression provided in the first line. Rather, one 
needs to compare the optimal consumption growth rate (0) with the decentralized consumption growth rate (0). 
A parallel statement holds for the proceeding model versions. 
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optimal consumption tax rate equals the negative of the marginal degree of positionality 
regarding relative wealth. Let v(C,K, K r ) ≡ u(C,K, K / K ) , with K r ≡ K / K . As in 
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), the marginal degree of positionality with respect to wealth 
is generally defined by 
 MDPk =
∂v(.) / ∂K r( ) ∂K r / ∂K( )
∂v(.) / ∂K r( ) ∂K r / ∂K( ) + ∂v(.) / ∂K( )
=
ηk
ηk + (1− ηk )ξ
 . (0) 
Consider a rise in K . The numerator shows the marginal utility of wealth stemming only 
from a rise in relative wealth. The denominator shows the marginal utility of wealth from both 
sources – indirect (via the change in relative wealth) and direct (via the change in absolute 
wealth). The ratio, then, identifies the share of marginal utility of wealth that is due to the fact 
that own wealth raises the ratio  K / K , ceteris paribus. That is, the optimal consumption tax 
rate is the Pigouvian tax rate internalizing the externality due to over-saving. A rise in the 
degree of positionality raises the (absolute values) of the optimal tax rates (or subsidies).  
 
 
Corollary 1.  
If and only if ηk = 0 , the optimal consumption- and income tax rates equal zero. In 
particular, positional preferences with respect to wealth always introduce a distortion. 
 
Corollary 1 implies that positional preferences with respect to wealth are distortionary 
whether or not households exhibit a preference for absolute wealth. This leads us to a brief 
discussion of the role of the preference for absolute wealth, ξ . 
 
Corollary 2.  
Consider ξ > 0 . The preference for absolute wealth is non-distortionary. However, ξ  does 
impact on the strength of the distortion once positionality in wealth exists, and thereby on the 
magnitudes of the corrective income- or consumption tax rates in that case. 
 
A preference for absolute wealth only is non-distortionary, as established by Judd (1985) and 
Chamley (1986). However, once ηk > 0 , ξ  does impact on the strength of the distortion. A 
rise in ξ  lowers the distortion and thereby the (absolute values of the) optimal consumption- 
and income tax rates. In (0), this is directly seen for the optimal consumption tax rate. 
However, it also applies to the optimal income tax rate – via its impact on ĉ .  
 15
 
Consider first ξ = 0  and ηk > 0 . In this case, the optimal consumption subsidy assumes the 
extreme value of τ̂ c = −1 . The optimal consumption tax rate equals the marginal rate of 
substitution of K  for K . In our framework, considering equation (0), this marginal rate of 
substitution equals −1 in equilibrium.17 Consider next a rise in ξ . The marginal degree of 
positionality declines in ξ . As seen in (0), a rise in ξ  does not impact on either the numerator 
or the first term of the denominator. However, ξ  raises the direct marginal utility of wealth 
(cf. the second term in the denominator). The decline in the marginal degree of positionality 
translates into a decline in the optimal consumption subsidy. Likewise, the decline in the 
marginal degree of positionality translates into a decline in the optimal income tax rate (via a 
lowering in ĉ). Consider finally the case where ξ = 1. In this case, the degree of positionality 
equals ηk , and the optimal consumption tax rate equals −ηk . 
 
As a policy prescription, only based on the baseline model, consumption should be subsidized 
and income be taxed in order to internalize the distortion stemming from the wealth 
positionality. Put differently, the Pigouvian consumption subsidy (income tax) prevents 
people from engaging in the rat race for attaining a higher social status via over-saving. The 




In the proceeding subsection, we show that this policy prescription is strongly modified when 
households are also concerned with relative consumption, in addition to relative wealth. 
 
2.2 The Impact of Consumption Positionality 
 
We now extend our baseline model to include positionality with respect to consumption. 
Households are concerned not only about relative wealth but also about their consumption 
relative to others. This is captured by an additional term, C / C , in the utility function, where 
C  represents some consumption reference level and the term C / C  is referred to as relative 
                                               
17
 This result holds in our multiplicative specification, but is not restricted to this particular functional form. 
Even a subtractive specification yields the same marginal rate of substitution. 
18




, the presence of a preference for absolute wealth impacts on the 
levels of the optimal taxes. 
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, − ∞ < γ < 1, 0 ≤ η
c
< 1, 0 ≤ η
k
< 1, ξ ≥ 0.
 (0) 
Parameter ηc  indexes the degree of concern for relative consumption. In fact, ηc  represents 
the marginal degree of positionality with respect to consumption, MDPc . That is, MDPc = ηc  
is the share of marginal utility of consumption that is due to the fact that own consumption 
raises the ratio  C / C , ceteris paribus.  
 
The optimization problem for the consumer remains the same as in (0) with the utility 
function modified by the consumption positionality in line with (0). Taking the first-order 
conditions with respect to C and K and following the same steps as in the baseline model 
leads us to the expression for the growth rate of the consumption-to-capital ratio: 
 
    .  (0) 
Along a BGP, , the consumption-to-capital ratio assumes its steady state value  c
*
, and 
the endogenous growth rate of per capita consumption and income becomes 
 
Γ* = A −δ
k
− c* . 
Clearly, the steady state values, (c*,Γ*), of the model with a consumption externality differ 
from those of the baseline model (though the latter can be recovered by setting η
c
= 0  in (0)). 
 
Proposition 2. (Impact of preferences for (relative) wealth and consumption on growth)  









> 0)  impact on the endogenous growth rate of per capita 
consumption and income  Γ
*
. Suppose τ y = 0 = τ c  and 0 ≤ ξ ≤1 .  Assume γ < 0 , as 





























> 0 . 
 
Proof.    See Appendix A.1.19 
 
There is overwhelming empirical evidence for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to be 
lower than one ( γ < 0 ).
20
 We address this case to discuss Proposition 2. The other case, in 









, on the (long-run) elasticities of intertemporal 
substitution: 
 
1/ (1− γ (1−η
c
))  for consumption; 
 
1/ (1− γ ξ(1− η
k
))  for wealth. Notice that the 








 raises the long-run elasticities of intertemporal substitution, once 
 γ < 0 . Intuitively, 








). Considering (0), 
ceteris paribus, this rise leads an individual household to raise her steady state consumption 




 raises the long-run elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution of C, thereby lowering the desire for consumption smoothing. As a 
consequence, households prefer a higher consumption growth rate over a higher initial 




. Finally, a rise in the preference for wealth, ξ , 
raises growth, as households increase saving regardless of positional preferences. 
 
This result is very much in line with the idea that positional preferences give rise to more 
economic activity or a higher endogenous growth rate. In fact, Adam Smith (1759, 1976) 
notes that “With the most unrelenting industry he labours night and day to acquire talents 
superior to all his competitors. He endeavours next to bring those talents into public view. ... 
                                               
19 The appendices are not part of the published paper. They are available online (and can be obtained from the 
authors upon request). 
20
 Hall (1988, p.350) favors a value for the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption of (at most) 0.2. Other 
empirical estimates include Grossman and Shiller (1981), and Mankiw (1981, 1985) or Constantinides (1990). 
All of these authors present evidence for that parameter to significantly fall short of unity. Hansen and Singleton 
(1983) present evidence for this parameter to be greater than unity, though. Their adopted approach, however, 
was criticized by Hall (1988, p.345).  
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It is this which first prompted them to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found cities 
and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts, which ennoble and 
embellish human life; which have entirely changed the whole face of the globe”. More 
recently, Schulte (2014) discusses empirical studies emphasizing that due to social 
comparisons we are too busy to enjoy life.  
 
Social comparisons change our saving- and consumption behavior. Whether or not social 
comparisons change this behavior in a non-optimal way is studied next.  
 
Social Optimum.   We now go on to analyze the distortionary impact of the consumption 
positionality. In the social optimization problem, the planner internalizes the externalities by 
choosing C = C  in addition to K = K at the outset. The resulting optimal growth rate of the 
consumption-to-capital ratio is given by: 
 
 .  (0) 
 
Comparing (0) with (0) enables us to derive the optimal consumption- and income tax rates. 
As before, in (0), τ̂ c  refers to the case in which τ y = 0, and τ̂ y  refers to the case in which 




ηk (1− ηc ) − ηc (1− ηk )ξ
(1− ηc ) (1− ηk )ξ +ηk[ ]
if ξ > 0 or ηk > 0






, τ̂ y =




Proposition 3. (Optimal taxation with consumption positionality) 
(i) The optimal consumption- and income taxes are given by (0). Imposing either the optimal 
consumption tax or the optimal income tax enables the decentralized economy to attain the 
first-best optimum.  
(ii) If and only if the marginal degree of positionality of consumption matches that of wealth, 
both optimal tax rates equal zero: MDPc = MDPk ⇔ ηc =
ηk




Proposition 3 immediately follows from considering the numerators in (0). The first insight is 
that the first-best can be attained by either an optimal consumption tax or an optimal income 
tax. In spite of the presence of two externalities – consumption positionality and wealth 
positionality – only one tax instrument is required to attain the social optimum. The reason is 
that labor supply is exogenous. That is, both consumption- and wealth positionality distort 
only the consumption-saving decision. As a consequence, only one instrument is needed to 
correct for the distortionary effects of positionality with respect to consumption in addition to 
wealth. 
 
The second insight is that – in spite of positional preferences – optimal tax rates may be equal 






= 0 , when preferences are not positional. Second, also if MDPc = MDPk , the optimal 
consumption- or income tax rates are equal to zero. In this case, the incentive to over-save 






> 0  both raise the 
endogenous growth rate. However, once the condition stated in Proposition 3 is satisfied, this 







≥ 0 . 
 









> 0  or  ξ > 0 , then consumption positionality is distortionary. 
 
















> 0  or  ξ > 0 . This asymmetry implies that cultures in which people are positional 
with respect to consumption only, no distortion is introduced. The endogenous growth rate 
increases – though, in an optimal way. However, in a culture in which people are positional 





= ξ = 0  the same Keynes-Ramsey rule holds in the decentralized- and the 
centralized solutions. The consumption positionality does not impact on the optimal 
consumption growth rate differently between the decentralized- and the centralized economy. 




> 0  or  ξ > 0 , the Keynes-Ramsey rule differs between the 
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decentralized- and the centralized economy. This is because the derivative of the Hamiltonian 
with respect to the capital stock contains a term, the marginal utility of wealth, that itself 
depends on the consumption externality. Individuals do not internalize this externality, 
whereas the government does so. As a consequence, a modified Keynes-Ramsey rule requires 
the government to choose a capital stock that is affected by the strength of the consumption 







regardless of whether or not we have a consumption externality, and this is one of the 
important results in our paper. 
 

















k( ) > 0 , optimal corrective taxation requires  τ̂ c > 0, τ̂ y < 0 . Anecdotal evidence 
would associate “southern countries” with this pattern of positional preferences. Likewise, 





k( ) < 0 , optimal corrective taxation requires  τ̂ c < 0, τ̂ y > 0 . 
Anecdotal evidence would associate “northern countries” (with Protestant ethic) with this 
pattern of positional preferences. 
 
Table 1. Optimal fiscal policy under positional preferences 
 Baseline Model Consumption Positionality 
 ξ > 0, ηk = 0 ξ > 0, ηk > 0  ξ > 0, ηk > 0, ηc > 0  
τ̂ y  0 ηkc
A
  
ηk (1− ηc ) −ηc(1− ηk )ξ[ ]c
A(1− ηc )
  
τ̂ c   0 −
ηk
















∂τ̂ y / ∂ξ    −    −  * 
∂τ̂ y / ∂ηk    +    +  * 
∂τ̂ y / ∂ηc            −  *
, ** 
∂τ̂ c / ∂ξ    +  +   
∂τ̂ c / ∂ηk    −  −   
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∂τ̂ c / ∂ηc     +   
Note. Sufficient conditions for the signs to hold: * γ < 0 ;  ** 1−η




One special case, involving a discontinuity, deserves attention. If  ξ = 0  (and  ηk > 0 ), then the 
optimal consumption subsidy equals  −1, regardless of whether or not there is consumption 










= 0 , the optimal consumption subsidy discontinuously jumps to the value 
zero. The reason is given above already. With  ξ = 0  and  ηk = 0 , consumption positionality is 
not distortionary, as shown in Corollary 3. With  ξ = 0  and  ηk > 0 , consumption positionality 




, the marginal 
rate of substitution of  K  for K equals  −1, and so does the optimal consumption subsidy. The 
previous array summarizes the discussion on optimal fiscal policy. 
 
 
3. The Model with Public Capital 
 
In this section, we extend our baseline model to include a specific source for endogenous 
growth: public capital. The inclusion of public capital serves two purposes. First, public 
investment provides a “microfoundation” for endogenous growth – approximated by the AK-
formulation in the base model above. We derive the optimal tax rates in this endogenous 
growth framework and show that the results derived above are robust with respect to the 
introduction of this microfoundation for endogenous growth. Second, we use this refined 
framework to numerically simulate a variety of fiscal policy reforms below. These 
simulations show that the effects of fiscal policy reforms (on growth) are highly sensitive with 






, ξ .  
 
3.1 The Impact of Public Capital in the Production Function 
 
While households face the same decision problem as in the (extended) base model above, the 
economic environment for firms and for the government changes.  
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, 0 < α < 1, − 1< ρ < ∞ .  (0) 
 
The elasticity of substitution between private capital and the public good is given by 






> β  . (A.2) 
 
The assumption implies that the private rate of interest strictly exceeds the rate of time 
preference, similar to (A.1). 
 
Government.   Here, in contrast to the baseline model, the government invests in public 
capital (infrastructure). Public capital evolves according to: 
 
 , (0) 
 




 is the rate of 
depreciation of public capital. The flow of public expenditures is a fixed share  g > 0  of 
output. As before, in each period, the government runs a balanced budget. The government 








Y + T − gY = 0 . (0) 
 
As we consider a closed economy, the aggregate resource constraint is given by: 
 
  (0) 
 
The optimization problem for the decentralized economy remains the same as in the 
(extended) base model above, with the production function being modified by public capital 
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in line with (0). We define the normalized variables,  y ≡ Y / K  and  
z ≡ K
g
/ K , where 
 
y = A α + (1− α )z− ρ 
−1/ρ




= α A− ρ y1+ρ .21 Taking the first-order conditions with respect to C and K and following the 
same steps as in the baseline model leads us to the expression for the growth rate of the 




We observe that replacing the term  (1− g)y  with A in (0) immediately yields the 
corresponding growth rate (0) in the baseline model. From the two capital accumulation 
equations (0) and (0), it follows:  
 . (0) 
 
Differential equations (0) and (0) represent the model’s two-dimensional dynamic system in 
the dynamic variables  c  and  z .  
 
The economy will in steady state follow a balanced growth path, defined as a path along 
which  Y ,C, K  and  
K
g




grow at the same constant growth rate  Γ
*
 along a BGP. That is, in a steady state, . 
As can be easily verified, the steady state is a saddle point and is saddle point stable. In 





Social optimum.   For analyzing the distortionary impact of the wealth- and consumption 
positionalities, we follow the steps presented above with two exceptions. First, the 
government has an additional control variable g, the share of government spending to GDP. 
Second, the government has an additional constraint regarding public capital accumulation, 
                                               
21




= A .  
22
 Existence and stability of a (the) steady state is discussed in a working paper version of this paper that is 
available at: http://www100.uni-graz.at/vwlwww/forschung/RePEc/wpaper/2014-09.pdf . 
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 enters as an additional state variable, next to private 
capital K.  
 





 as state variables into consideration leads us to the optimal growth rate of the 
consumption-to-capital ratio (details of the derivation are given in Appendix A.2): 
 
   (0) 
 
Comparing the optimal solution (0) with the decentralized solution (0) provides us with two 
important results.  
 
Proposition 4. (Optimal taxation with public capital as the growth engine) 
Consider the model with public capital as the endogenous growth engine. If g is chosen 
optimally, the optimal consumption- and income tax rates are given by: 
τ̂ c =
−
ηk (1− ηc ) − ηc (1− ηk )ξ
(1− ηc ) (1− ηk )ξ + ηk[ ]
if ξ > 0 or ηk > 0






, τ̂ y =
ηk (1− ηc ) − ηc (1−ηk )ξ[ ] ĉ
YK (1− ηc )
.  (0) 
Once g is chosen optimally, the optimal consumption- and income tax rates, in a steady state, 




= A .  
Moreover, the optimal income tax rate, due to endogeneity of  ĉ  and  ẑ  (via  
Y
K
), depends on 
the optimal government expenditure share g.  
 
In (0), τ̂ c  refers to the case in which τ y = 0, and τ̂ y  refers to the case in which τ c = 0 . The 
proposition shows that the optimal corrective tax rates, as derived for the baseline model, are 
robust with respect to the specification of the endogenous growth engine. However, it is 
important to note that here, in the extended model with public capital – which exhibits 
transitional dynamics – the optimal consumption- and income tax rates refer to the BGP only.  
 
Proposition 4 shows the optimal corrective income tax rates only in implicit form. In contrast 
to the baseline model, it is not possible anymore to express  c, z  explicitly. While the 
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interpretation of the optimal tax rates equals that given for the baseline model, the levels are 
influenced not only by the preference- (positionality-) parameters, but also by the optimal 
government expenditure share g. The latter is roughly proportional to its productivity in the 
production function,  (1−α ) . In order to gain some insight regarding the sensitivity of the 






,ξ) , we employ numerical simulations. 
 
We complete this section by deriving an expression for welfare. In Appendix A.3, we show 
that for both the decentralized as well as the centralized framework, the steady state welfare 













 , (0) 
where the growth rate Γ = Γ(z). It should be noted that here welfare is expressed implicitly, 
as both c and z cannot be expressed explicitly in terms of parameters. Consider the main case, 
according to which γ < 0 . Then, a rise in the endogenous growth rate Γ  and a decline in the 
consumption-capital ratio raise welfare. In the following two sections, we employ (0) to 
quantify the respective impact of a variation of the preferences parameters and the 
introduction of several policy shocks (for differing values of the preference parameters) on 
steady state welfare. 
 
3.2 Numerical Simulations 
 
To get a flavor of how the optimal values of the corrective income- and consumption taxes are 
affected by the key behavioral parameters of the model we calculate (τ̂ y ,τ̂ c , ĝ)  based on 
benchmark parameter values commonly employed in the literature. In addition, we calculate 
the impact of the key behavioral parameters on steady state welfare, endogenous growth and 
the consumption-capital ratio (both of which are needed to explain the associated welfare 
changes). 
 
Preference parameters are assigned the following values: β = 0.04, γ = −1.5 . The latter 
parameter gives rise to an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 1/ (1− γ ) = 0.4 , as 
suggested by Guvenen (2006). Technology parameters are assigned the following values: 
A = 0.6, α = 0.8, ρ = 1, δ g = δ k = 0.08 . First, following common practice, we use the total 
 26
factor productivity, A, as a scale parameter to help us obtain plausible values for the growth 
rate, and a value of A = 0.6  achieves that. The value of α (which is the output-elasticity of 
private capital) is set at 0.8, which is plausible if private capital is meant to include human 
capital, as in Romer (1986). This also implies that the elasticity of public capital is 0.2, which 
is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Gramlich (1994). There is not much 
empirical evidence on the elasticity of substitution between private and public capital (Lynde 
and Richmond, 1993, provides an exception); 
 ρ = 1, which corresponds to this elasticity 
being equal to 1/ (1+ ρ) = 0.5 , is one of the values for this parameter chosen by Chatterjee 
and Ghosh (2011). Finally, the depreciation rates for the private and public capital stocks are 




Based on these benchmark values, we focus on the impact of different values of the key 
preference parameters (ηc ,ηk ,ξ ) on the optimal policy variables ( τ̂ c ,τ̂ y, ĝ ), as well as on the 
optimal variables 
 (ĉ,Γ̂,Ŵ ) , where Ŵ  indicates optimal steady state welfare. 
 
We first briefly address the role of ξ , the preference for absolute- (as opposed to relative-) 
wealth. In Table 2, we vary ξ  while having fixed (ηc , ηk ) = (0.4,0.4). These values of the 
positionality parameters are empirically supported. Compiling several empirical studies, 




 are found to fall within the range, 
ηi ∈[0.2, 0.4], i ∈ c,k{ }. Other studies find empirical evidence for even larger values of  ηi  
(cf. Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002, Solnick and Hemenway 1998, 2005). Newer empirical 
studies corroborate this evidence (Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2012, Dynan and Ravina 2007). 
 
Table 2 reveals the strong impact of the preference for absolute wealth on the optimal 
corrective tax scheme. In fact, with ξ = 1, MDPc = MDPk  and, according to Proposition 4, the 
optimal corrective tax rates are equal to zero. If ξ < 1, for given (ηc, ηk ) , MDPc < MDPk  and 
the optimal consumption tax rate becomes negative (the optimal income tax rate becomes 
positive). The reverse holds for ξ > 1, in which case MDPc > MDPk . That is, even if ηc = ηk , 
the optimal corrective tax structure depends on the preference for absolute wealth, ξ . For low 
values of ξ , it is optimal to subsidize consumption and tax income (at substantial rates). For 
                                               
23
 See also Baxter and King (1993), where the value for the rate of depreciation of the capital stock in the US is 
chosen at 10%. 
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high values of ξ , it is optimal to tax consumption and subsidize income. This is the first 
policy lesson, to be drawn from Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The optimal levels of (τ̂ c,τ̂ y, ĝ)  as well as (ĉ,Γ̂,Ŵ )  when ξ  is gradually 







τ̂ c   τ̂ y  ĝ  ĉ  Γ̂  Ŵ /Ŵ (0)
 
ξ = 0.2  -0.6154 0.2021 0.1881 0.2022 0.1157 1.1445  
ξ = 0.6  -0.2105 0.1014 0.1794 0.1885 0.1192 1.4370 
ξ = 1.0  0.0000 0.0000 0.1711 0.1785 0.1204 1.7305  
ξ = 1.4  0.1290 -0.1040 0.1636 0.1704 0.1205 2.0228   
ξ = 1.8  0.2162 -0.2112 0.1568 0.1636 0.1200 2.3134  
NOTE. (c,z,g)  are simultaneously derived employing the benchmark parameter values. 
Welfare is normalized so that Ŵ (ξ ) = Ŵ (0) = 1. 
 
In the simulations, the government always chooses its expenditure share for public capital, g, 
optimally. In contrast to the simpler Barro (1990) model, in which ĝ = (1− α ), here public 
capital is a stock rather than flow variable. As a consequence, ĝ < (1−α ). This difference 
occurs as the advantage of a larger public investment share materializes only tomorrow 
whereas the cost in terms of foregone consumption is to be paid today. No such intertemporal 




The optimal expenditure share for public capital is affected by the preference for absolute 
wealth, ξ . A rise in ξ , by raising the marginal utility of consumption, increases the cost of 
foregone consumption today. Therefore, the higher is ξ , the more ĝ  falls short of (1−α ). 
 
In Table 2, welfare is normalized to unity for ξ = 0 . As ξ  increases, a value larger than unity 
indicates a higher welfare level compared to the welfare level for ξ = 0 . A rise in the 
importance of wealth, ξ , fosters savings. Thereby, the consumption-capital ratio decreases, 
and the endogenous growth rate rises. As a consequence, considering our welfare expression 
(0), it follows that welfare is increased. Table 2 shows that this increase in welfare is quite 
pronounced. That is, quantitatively, not only optimal tax rates but also optimal welfare 
                                               
24
 For the stock formulation, the growth-maximizing share of public investment exceeds the welfare-maximizing 
share (cf. Escobar-Posada and Monteiro, 2015, or Futagami et al., 1993).  
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responds significantly to a rise in the preference for absolute wealth. This is the second policy 
lesson, to be drawn from Table 2. 
 
Next, we consider a variation in the positional preference for (relative) wealth. In Table 3, we 
vary ηk  while having set (ηc, ξ ) = (0,1) . A gradual increase in ηk  has a substantive impact on 
the magnitude of the optimal corrective tax rates. Wealth positionality implies over-saving. 
As a consequence, the optimal corrective income tax rate is positive, and the corrective 
consumption tax rate is negative – and the more so the stronger is the positional preference for 
wealth. 
 
A rise in the positional preference for wealth raises the consumption-capital ratio, and it 
lowers the optimal growth rate. Intuitively, in the pursuit to internalize the wealth externality, 
the social planner chooses a lower wealth level (in each period) along the BGP, which implies 
a higher consumption-wealth ratio. The lower wealth level is brought about by a lower growth 
rate of wealth (capital). That is, the endogenous growth rate along a BGP declines in ηk . As 
we assume that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than unity ( γ < 0 ), welfare 
expression (0) implies a decline in optimal welfare.   
 
Table 3. The optimal levels of (τ̂ c,τ̂ y, ĝ)  as well as (ĉ, Γ̂,Ŵ )  when ηk  is gradually 
increased, and ηc = 0, ξ = 1   
ηc = 0, ξ = 1 τ̂ c   τ̂ y  ĝ  ĉ  Γ̂  Ŵ /Ŵ (0) 
η
k
= 0   0.0000 0.0000 0.1419 0.2145 0.0908 1.0000 
η
k
= 0.1 -0.1000 0.0793 0.1439 0.2173 0.0908 0.9564 
η
k
= 0.2  -0.2000 0.1577 0.1460 0.2202 0.0907 0.9128 
η
k
= 0.3  -0.3000 0.2351 0.1482 0.2233 0.0905 0.8693 
ηk = 0.4  -0.4000 0.3115 0.1505 0.2266 0.0902 0.8257 
η
k
= 0.5  -0.5000 0.3872 0.1528 0.2300 0.0899 0.7823 
NOTE. (c,z,g)  are simultaneously derived employing the benchmark parameter values. 
Welfare is normalized so that Ŵ (ηk ) = Ŵ (0) = 1. 
 
It is interesting to compare the effects of a rise in the preference for relative wealth, ηk , with 
those of a rise in the preference for absolute wealth, ξ . As discussed above, while the former 
implies a higher optimal consumption-capital ratio and a lower growth rate, the latter implies 
a lower ĉ  and a higher Γ̂ . This result is important, as it shows that a preference for relative 
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wealth, via ηk , and a preference for absolute wealth, via ξ , impose opposite effects on the 
optimal corrective tax rates.  
 
Finally, we consider a variation in the positional preference for (relative) consumption. In 
Table 4, we vary ηc  while having fixed (ηk , ξ) = (0,1).  
 
Table 4. The optimal levels of (τ̂ c,τ̂ y, ĝ)  as well as (ĉ, Γ̂,Ŵ )  when ηc  is gradually 
increased, and ηk = 0, ξ = 1    
ηk = 0, ξ = 1
 
τ̂ c   τ̂ y  ĝ  ĉ  Γ̂  Ŵ /Ŵ (0) 
η
c
= 0  0.0000  0.0000 0.1419 0.2145 0.0908 1.0000 
η
c
= 0.1  0.1111 -0.0856 0.1454 0.2045 0.0968 1.2131 
η
c
= 0.2  0.2500 -0.1847 0.1494 0.1932 0.1035 1.4925 
η
c
= 0.3  0.4286 -0.3005 0.1539 0.1804 0.1113 1.8717 
η
c
= 0.4  0.6667 -0.4377 0.1590 0.1658 0.1202 2.4106 
ηc = 0.5  1.0000 -0.6025 0.1648 0.1488 0.1307 3.2267 
NOTE. (c,z,g)  are simultaneously derived employing the benchmark parameter values.  
Welfare is normalized so that Ŵ (ηc ) = Ŵ (0) = 1 . 
 
In Table 4, we set ξ = 1. Notice that without a preference for absolute wealth, that is ξ = 0 , 
the optimal corrective tax rates both equal zero, according to Proposition 4, regardless of the 
degree of positionality with respect to consumption. The more interesting case then is to 
consider a situation in which households are also concerned with absolute wealth (ξ > 0 ). 
The natural benchmark case is ξ = 1 , in which case ηc  and ηk  have the economic 
interpretation of the marginal degree of positionality with respect to consumption and wealth 
respectively.  
 
If ηc = 0 , there is no distortion, and the optimal corrective tax rates both equal zero, in spite 
of ξ > 0  (and in line with Corollary 2). In the pursuit to correct for over-consumption, a rise 
in ηc  raises the optimal corrective consumption tax rate and lowers the optimal corrective 
income tax rate (i.e., makes it a corrective subsidy).  
 
A rise in the positional preference for consumption lowers the optimal consumption-capital 
ratio, and it raises the optimal growth rate (see Table 4). To internalize the consumption 
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externality, the social planner needs to correct the consumption-savings decision of 
households. By raising the optimal consumption tax, the planner introduces a wedge between 
the price of consumption and the return on savings, thereby lowering consumption and raising 
savings. Consequently, the growth rate of capital increases, and the consumption-capital ratio 
declines. According to welfare expression (0), a rise in ηc  implies an increase in optimal 
welfare. 
 
While this is economically intuitive, the take-home message is the following. The optimal 
corrective consumption- and income tax rates become substantial even for empirically 
supported magnitudes of the degree of positionality with respect to consumption (Wendner 
and Goulder, 2008). In fact, the optimal corrective consumption tax rate varies between zero 
and unity for empirically supported values of ηc .  
 
Clearly, a word of caution is in order. In this simulation exercise (reported in Table 4), we 
assume that households are not positional with respect to wealth, i.e., ηk = 0 . As is to be 
learned from Proposition 3, if households are also positional with respect to wealth (ηk > 0 ), 
then the optimal corrective tax- (subsidy-) rates are expected to be lower. In the special case 
with ηk = ηc , the optimal corrective tax rates both become equal to zero.  
 
The optimal expenditure share for public capital is affected by both the preference for 
absolute wealth, ξ , as well as the positional preferences, as parameterized by (ηc,ηk ) . A rise 
in ξ , by raising the marginal utility of consumption, increases the cost of foregone 
consumption today. Therefore, the higher ξ  the more ĝ  falls short of (1−α ) . A rise in ηc  
has a different impact. It raises the long-run elasticity of intertemporal substitution of C, 
thereby lowering the desire for consumption smoothing. Thus, the fact that the advantage of a 
larger public investment share materializes only tomorrow whereas the cost in terms of 
foregone consumption is to be paid today is diminished. As a consequence, the higher is ηc  
the higher becomes ĝ . A parallel argument is valid for wealth positionality. 
 
Two more notes on ĝ  suggest themselves. First, ĝ  by itself cannot act as the only optimal 
policy instrument (replacing either τ̂ c  or τ̂ y ). This can easily be verified by comparing the 
consumption growth rate in the decentralized economy (0) with that in the social optimum (0)
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. The last term in each expression represents the growth rate of private capital. As this growth 
rate must be equal among the social optimum and the decentralized solution, g  must be equal 
as well. But with g  being equal, the first term in each expression (representing the growth 
rate of consumption) cannot be equal when τ̂ c = τ̂ y = 0 . Second, the optimal endogenous 
growth rate is quite high. This is (almost) entirely due to the high public infrastructure 
investment share. In the context of a decentralized economy, we assume a (more realistic) 
public infrastructure investment share of g = 0.05  (Chatterjee and Ghosh 2011). In this 
context, the decentralized endogenous growth rate of per capita consumption amounts to 
roughly 1.8% per year. However, as the simulations reveal, the optimal public infrastructure 
investment share is well above that level of g = 0.05. 
 
The key lessons from the simulation results are the following. Even if ηk ≈ ηc , the optimal 
corrective income- and consumption tax rates easily become very large. This seems to 
contrast the result above, where it was argued that with ηk ≈ ηc , the optimal tax rates are 
close to zero. That result, however, was true only for ξ = 1. In contrast, given that ξ  differs 
sufficiently from unity, it is shown that the optimal tax rates can be substantial in spite of 
ηk ≈ ηc . Moreover, the higher the ξ , the more likely the optimal consumption tax is positive, 
while the optimal income tax is negative. Let ηk ≈ ηc , then in cultures in which people value 
(absolute) wealth, the optimal consumption tax tends to be positive, while the optimal income 
tax is negative. Likewise, if ηk > ηc , the optimal corrective consumption tax rate is negative 
while the corrective income tax rate is positive. The opposite holds for the case in which 
ηk < ηc . In other words, cultures in which people are more positional with respect to wealth 
(with Protestant ethic, boldly speaking) face structurally different optimal corrective tax 





This paper contributes to the literature on positional preferences by introducing conspicuous 
wealth in the agent’s utility function, in addition to conspicuous consumption. And it does so 
within an endogenous growth set-up, both within an AK framework and where the engine of 
growth is public capital. Production externalities have been captured extensively in much of 
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the growth literature, but the same cannot be said about consumption externalities. And even 
when the latter have been considered, the reference level has mostly been conspicuous 
consumption rather than wealth. Our paper attempts to plug this gap, given that one objective 
in foregoing current consumption and accumulating capital, which increases wealth, is that 
this in itself adds to agents’ utility. In the process of enhancing wealth, individual wealth 
relative to the average is considered as an argument in the utility function. Considerations for 
absolute and relative wealth both turn out to be important and are captured in detail in our 
model. 
 
In the paper we found analytically that the presence of wealth positionality always causes 
distortions (although a preference for absolute wealth by itself is non-distortionary), which are 
corrected by an optimal consumption- (income-) tax which is negative (positive). We also 
demonstrate that if wealth is present in the consumer’s utility function, then – despite labor 
supply being inelastic – the introduction of a consumption externality always has a 
distortionary effect, except when the marginal degree of positionality in wealth exactly 
matches that of consumption. This modifies the previous results from endogenous growth 
models where, with inelastic labor supply, such distortionary effects are obtained only with 
production externalities. Interestingly, in our framework, if wealth is not present in the 
consumer’s utility function, this distortion disappears. In some sense, this result resembles 
those in models with conspicuous consumption (but not wealth), where there are no 
distortions; however, such models are typically neoclassical rather than endogenous growth 
models. While the effects of consumption externalities on growth and welfare in the 
decentralized economy broadly correspond to those in the social optimum, the effect of 
wealth externalities is to cause over-accumulation of capital by households in the 
decentralized economy. Here the social planner, in an effort to correct this externality, picks a 
growth rate that reduces the rate of capital accumulation to optimal levels. We also conduct 
some fiscal policy experiments where our results demonstrate that where an increase in public 
spending occurs, this positively and strongly affects both growth and welfare in the steady 
state and along the transition path, dominating the impact of consumption externalities. 
 
A number of important policy conclusions emerge from our findings, which are worth 
emphasizing. First, policymakers should acknowledge the importance of wealth (per se and 
also conspicuous wealth) in affecting utility, and implement corrective taxation recognizing 
this aspect of preferences. Second, the simultaneous use of income and consumption 
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tax/subsidy instruments as policy tools when preferences are positional is important. Thus, if 
households are more positional with respect to wealth (consumption), then income 
(consumption) should be taxed for corrective reasons. Finally, in such models with 
consumption- and wealth externalities, public spending should be encouraged as it impacts on 
growth and welfare in a decisive way. 
 
We have performed our analysis in the context of a closed economy, following much of the 
literature. Our paper could be extended to an open economy context – either a small open 
economy that has to take the world interest rate as given, or a large economy where economic 
policies would determine the domestic interest rate as in Ghosh and Mourmouras (2002) – 
where consumption and wealth externalities could be generated not only at home but also 
abroad. This would add an interesting new dimension to the growth and welfare analysis that 
we have conducted thus far, and make our analysis richer. To our knowledge, there have not 
yet been many studies that proceed in this direction: Fisher and Hof (2005) provides an 
attempt. 
 
Also, the standard growth models typically consider a constant rate of time preference, but 
recently a “preference-driven theory of economic growth” has been proposed by Strulik 
(2012), among others, where the rate of impatience varies negatively with wealth, i.e., as 
wealth increases, individuals tend to become more patient. Given that in our existing set-up, 
the inclusion of wealth and conspicuous wealth in the utility function makes a significant 
difference to the workings of the baseline model (where positional preferences are defined 
with respect to consumption alone), the introduction of wealth-driven time preference will 
surely introduce another interesting element in the determination of growth and welfare. 
 
Finally, we have in our paper devised appropriate income- and consumption-taxes (under 
perfect information) to correct distortions. If, instead, we considered agents that were status-
conscious but heterogeneous, then one could work out the optimal redistributive taxes for 
such an economy (see, for example, Mirrlees (1971)). One source of heterogeneity could be 
the ability level (i.e., the presence of low- and high-ability households), in which case one 
needs to take into account asymmetric information regarding the ability level. In the context 
of our model, another source of heterogeneity might be different levels of wealth or different 
(positional/non-positional) preferences for wealth.  
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We have made some progress in pursuing research in these directions, but that would 
obviously be the subject of other papers and beyond the scope of the current one. 
 
 
Supplementary material  




We are indebted to Stella Zilian for valuable research assistance. We are most grateful to two 
anonymous referees (and especially to one of the referees for being so meticulous!), as well as 
to the associate editor, whose detailed comments and suggestions contributed to substantial 
improvements of this paper. We also thank Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, Thomas Aronsson, 
John Bennett, Evangelos Dioikitopoulos, Olof Johansson-Stenman, Xavier Raurich, Udayan 
Roy, Fernando Sanchez, Richard Sturn, Tom Truyts and Ngo Van Long for insightful debates 
on a previous version of this paper. We are also grateful for helpful feedback during and after 
presentations at the Indian Statistical Institute in Delhi, as well as at the Universities of 





Alonso-Carrera, J., J. Caballé, X. Raurich (2005), Growth, Habit Formation, and Catching Up 
with the Joneses, European Economic Review 49, 1665-1691. 
 
Alpizar, F., F. Carlsson, O. Johansson-Stenman (2005) How Much do we Care About 
Absolute Versus Relative Income and Consumption?, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 56, 405-421.  
 
Alvarez-Cuadrado, F., J.M. Casado, J.M. Labeaga, D. Sutthiphisal (2012), Envy and Habits: 
Panel Data Estimates of Interdependent Preferences, Banco de Espana Working Paper 1213, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014005.  
 
Aronsson, T., Johansson-Stenman, O. (2008), When the Joneses’ consumption hurts: optimal 
public good provision and nonlinear income taxation. Journal of Public Economics 92, 986–
997. 
 
Aronsson, T., Johansson-Stenman, O. (2010), Positional concerns in an OLG model: optimal 
labor and capital income taxation. International Economic Review 51, 1071–1095. 
 
Aronsson, T., Johansson-Stenman, O. (2013), Conspicuous leisure: optimal income taxation 
 35
when both relative consumption and relative leisure matter. Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics 115, 155–175. 
 
Barro, R.J. (1990), Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth, Journal 
of Political Economy 98, S103-S125. 
 
Baxter, M., R.G. King (1993), Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium, American Economic 
Review 83, 315-334. 
 
Blomquist, S. (1993), Interdependent behavior and the effect of taxes. Journal of Public 
Economics 51, 211–218. 
 
Carroll, C.D., J.R. Overland, D.N. Weil (1997), Comparison Utility in a Growth Model, 
Journal of Economic Growth 2, 339-367. 
 
Chamley, C. (1986), Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite 
Lives, Econometrica, 54, 607-622. 
 
Chatterjee, S., S. Ghosh (2011), The Dual Nature of Public Goods and Congestion: The Role 
of Fiscal Policy Revisited, Canadian Journal of Economics 44, 1471-1496. 
 
Constantinides, G.M. (1990), Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity Premium Puzzle, 
Journal of Political Economy 98, 519-543. 
 
Corneo, G., O. Jeanne (1997), On Relative-Wealth Effects and the Optimality of Growth, 
Economics Letters 54, 87-92. 
 
Corneo, G., O. Jeanne (2001), On Relative-Wealth Effects and Long-Run Growth, Research 
in Economics 55, 349-358. 
 
Croushore, D. (1993), Money in the Utility Function: Functional Equivalence to a Shopping-
Time Model, Journal of Macroeconomics 15, 175-182. 
 
Dupor, B., W.F. Liu (2003), Jealousy and Equilibrium Overconsumption, American 
Economic Review 93, 423-428. 
 
Dynan, K. E., and Ravina, E. (2007). “Increasing income inequality, external habits, and self-
reported happiness.” American Economic Review 97, 226–231. 
 
Easterlin, R.A. (1995), Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All? 
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation 27, 35-47. 
 
Eckerstorfer, P., R. Wendner (2013), Asymmetric and Non-atmospheric Consumption 
Externalities, and Efficient Consumption Taxation, Journal of Public Economics 106, 42-56. 
 
Escobar-Posada, R.A., G. Monteiro (2015), Long-run Growth and Welfare in a Two Sector 
Endogenous Growth Model with Productive and Non-productive Government Expenditure, 
Journal of Macroeconomics 46, 218-234.  
 
Fisher, W.H., F.X. Hof (2000), Relative Consumption, Economic Growth, and Taxation, 
Journal of Economics 72, 241-262. 
 36
 
Fisher, W.H., F.X. Hof (2005), Status Seeking in the Small Open Economy, Journal of 
Macroeconomics 27, 209-232. 
 
Frank, R.H. (2005), Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventative Welfare 
Distortions, American Economic Review 95, 137-141. 
 
Frank, R.H. (2008), Should public policy respond to positional externalities? Journal of 
Public Economics 92, 1777–1786. 
 
Futagami, K., Y. Morita, A. Shibata (1993), Dynamic Analysis of an Endogenous Growth 
Model with Public Capital, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95, 607-625. 
 
Futagami, K., A. Shibata (1998), Keeping One Step Ahead of the Joneses: Status, the 
Distribution of Wealth, and Long Run Growth, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 36, 93-111. 
 
Ghosh, S., I.A. Mourmouras (2002), On Public Investment, Long-Run Growth and the Real 
Exchange Rate, Oxford Economic Papers  54, 72-90. 
 
Gramlich, E.M. (1994), Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay, Journal of Economic 
Literature 32, 1176-1196. 
 
Grossman, S., R.J. Shiller (1981), The Determinants of the Variability of Stock Market Prices, 
American Economic Review 71, 301–307.   
 
Guvenen, F. (2006), Reconciling Conflicting Evidence on the Elasticity of Intertemporal 
Substitution: A Macroeconomic Perspective, Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 1451-1472. 
 
Hall, R.E. (1988), Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption, Journal of Political Economy 
96, 339-357. 
 
Hansen, L.P., K.J. Singleton (1983), Stochastic Consumption, Risk Aversion, and the 
Temporal Behavior of Asset Returns, Journal of Poltical Economy 91, 249–265.   
 
Hof, F.X., F. Wirl (2008), Wealth Induced Multiple Equilibria in Small Open Economy 
Versions of the Ramsey Model, Homo Oeconomicus 25, 107-128. 
 
Ireland, N.J. (2001), Optimal income tax in the presence of status effects. Journal of Public 
Economics 81, 193–212. 
 
Johansson-Stenman, O., F. Carlsson, D. Daruvala (2002), Measuring Future Grandparents’ 
Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing, Economic Journal 112, 362-383. 
 
Judd, K.L. (1985), Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model, Journal of 
Public Economics, 28, 59-83. 
 
Mankiw, N.G. (1981), The Permanent Income Hypothesis and the Real Interest Rate, 
Economics Letters 7, 307–311.   
 
 37
Mankiw, N.G. (1985), Consumer Durables and the Real Interest Rate, Review of Economics 
and Statistics 67, 353–362.  
 
Layard, R. (2006), Happiness and Public Policy; a challenge to the profession, Economic 
Journal 116, C24-C23. 
 
Liu, W.F., S.J. Turnovsky (2005), Consumption Externalities, Production Externalities, and 
Long-Run Macroeconomic Efficiency, Journal of Public Economics 89, 1097-1129. 
 
Lynde, C., J. Richmond (1993), Public Capital and Long-Run Costs in U.K. Manufacturing, 
Economic Journal 103, 880-893. 
  
Mirrlees, J.A. (1971), An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, Review of 
Economic Studies 38, 175-208. 
 
Nakamoto, Y. (2009), Jealousy and Underconsumption in a One-Sector Model with Wealth 
Preference, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, 2015-2029. 
 
Oswald, A.J. (1983), Altruism, Jealousy and the Theory of Optimal Non-Linear Taxation, 
Journal of Public Economics 20, 77-87. 
 
Pham, T.K.C. (2005), Economic Growth and Status-Seeking Through Personal Wealth, 
European Journal of Political Economy 21, 404-427. 
 
Rae, J. (1905), The Sociological Theory of Capital, New York: Macmillan. (Originally 
published in 1834.) 
 
Rauscher, M. (1997a), Conspicuous Consumption, Economic Growth, and Taxation, Journal 
of Economics 66, 35-42. 
 
Rauscher, M. (1997b), Protestant Ethic, Status Seeking, and Economic Growth, Thunen-
Series of Applied Economic Theory, No. 09. 
 
Rebelo, S. (1991), Long Run Policy Analysis and Long Run Growth, Journal of Political 
Economy 99, 500-521. 
 
Romer, P.M. (1986), Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, Journal of Political Economy 
94, 1002-1037. 
 
Schulte, B. (2014), Overwhelmed Work, Love, and Play when No One has the Time, New 
York: Sarah Crichton Books. 
 
Smith, A. (1759, 1976), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
Raphael, D.D., A.L. Macfie, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Solnick, S.J., D. Hemenway (1998), Is More Always Better? A Survey on Positional 
Concerns, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 37, 373-383. 
 
Solnick, S.J., D. Hemenway (2005), Are Positional Concerns Stronger in Some Domains 
Than in Others?, American Economic Review 95, 147-151. 
 
 38
Strulik, H. (2012), Patience and Prosperity, Journal of Economic Theory 147, 336-352. 
 
Tournemaine, F., C. Tsoukis (2008), Relative Consumption, Relative Wealth and Growth, 
Economics Letters 100, 314-316. 
 
Truyts, T. (2010), Social Status in Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Surveys 24, 137- 
169.  
 
Turnovsky, S.J. (2004), The Transitional Dynamics of Fiscal Policy: Long-Run Capital 
Accumulation and Growth, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36, 883-910. 
 
Turnovsky, S.J., G. Monteiro (2007), Consumption Externalities, Production Externalities, 
and Efficient Capital Accumulation Under Time Non-Separable Preferences, European 
Economic Review 51, 479-504.  
 
Veblen, T. (1899), The Theory of the Leisure Class, in The Theory of the Leisure Class, 
republished in 1973, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, MA. 
 
Weber, M. (1904), The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, republished in 1958, 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York. 
 
Wendner, R. (2014), Ramsey, Pigou, Heterogeneous Agents, and Non-atmospheric 
Consumption Externalities, Journal of Public Economic Theory 16, 491-521. 
 
Wendner, R., L. Goulder (2008), Status Effects, Public Goods Provision, and the Excess 
Burden, Journal of Public Economics 92, 1968-1985. 
 
Zou, H. (1994), ‘The Spirit of Capitalism’ and Long-Run Growth, European Journal of 
Political Economy 10, 279-293.  
 
Zou, H. (1995), The Spirit of Capitalism and Savings Behavior, Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 28, 131-143. 
 
